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EVOLVING STANDARDS

FOR

DuTY

OF FAIR REPRESENTATION

CASES UNDER SECTION

301

INTRODUCTION

The duty of fair representation (DFR) is a court-created doctrine
designed to protect employees from the very organizations entrusted
with their representation: labor unions.' In applying the doctrine,
courts aspire to strike a balance between the discretion of the union to
determine who should benefit from their representation, how that representation is effected, and the individual interests and rights of the employee. Complicating this balancing test is Congress' goal reflected in
the Wagner Act, 2 to provide an exclusive means for settlement of labor
disputes outside of the courts that would be final and binding on the
parties involved.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court exercised great discretion before it
created the duty of fair representation as a means for judicial intervention in the arena of labor dispute settlements. The seminal case involved racial discrimination by a labor organization certified under the
Railway Labor Act (RLA) 3 in negotiating a collective bargaining agreement. Currently, in light of an increasing judicial concern to safeguard
employees' rights vis a vis their bargaining representatives, the doctrine
has been expanded to cover every aspect of union representation, from
contract negotiation 4 to contract administration. 5 Remedies have been
provided for union conduct amounting to little more than mere
6
negligence.
This expansion by the courts was not accomplished easily. In 1962,
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) recognized a
union's duty to represent its members fairly in Miranda Fuel Co. 7 By labelling the breach an unfair labor practice under section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act), 8 the Board assumed
exclusive jurisdiction over DFR claims. In 1962, in Smith v. Evening News
Association,9 the Supreme Court used section 301 of the Taft-Hartley
1. As exclusive bargaining representative under § 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982), a union is entrusted with an obligation to represent those within a craft equally "without hostility to any." Cf Ford Motor
Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1952).
2. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168
(1982)).
3. 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). The case was Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co.,
323 U.S. 192 (1944).
4. Steele, 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
5. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
6. Ruggirello v. Ford Motor Co., 411 F. Supp. 758, 760 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
7. Miranda Fuel Co. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962) (holding that a union's breach of the
duty of fair representation constituted an unfair labor practice, violating § 8(b)(l)(a), 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(l)(a), and § 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) of the Act.
8. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982).
9. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
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Act' 0 to assume concurrent jurisdiction with the NLRB over unfair labor
practice claims when a breach of contract is alleged by an employee
against his employer. Following Smith, the Court assumed jurisdiction
over DFR suits brought under section 301 in Humphrey v. Moore."I
Frequently, section 301 DFR claims name both a union and an employer as defendants, charging the union with a breach of its duty of fair
representation, and the employer with breach of the collective bargaining agreement. 12 Such suits are termed "hybrid" suits as a valid cause of
action against the union is a prerequisite to recovery from the employer
for breach of the collective bargaining agreement. 13 The court may
4
then fashion a remedy against both defendants.'
At one time the NLRB entertained hybrid DFR suits as unfair labor
practices under the NLRA, 15 but since 1980, this particular hybrid action has apparently disappeared from the text of published decisions,16
while its frequency in the courts under section 301 has increased.1 7 One
reason for this trend is that the Board has unreviewable discretion to
hear cases. Another compelling reason is that unlike actions before the
Board, the courts can award damages under section 301.18 In both jurisdictions, an employee must exhaust his intra-union remedies before
he may bring a DFR claim, yet once a breach is found, the Board or
court may vacate an arbitrator's award.
This note will commence with an examination of the origins of the
duty of fair representation, including the expansion of DFR to contract
and grievance administration under section 301. A survey of the stan10. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982) allows actions for breach of a collective bargaining contract to be brought in federal court.
11. 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
12. Breach of contract is a required allegation in any § 301 suit. An employer cannot
be charged with a breach of the duty of fair representation in the absence of a showing of
impermissable conduct. American Postal Workers Union Local 6885 v. American Postal
Workers Union, 665 F.2d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
13. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967).
14. Id. at 187-88.
15. Generally these suits require some form of cooperative activity between the union
and the employer. Mere compliance with a union demand rather than actual collusion was
sufficient to state a cause of action in Strick Corp. 241 N.L.R.B. 210 (1979) (collective
bargaining agreement between union and employer nullified remedies provided to discharged employees by an arbitrator's award; complaint dismissed due to failure to show
arbitrary, invidious, or discriminatory conduct). See also ITT Arctic Services, Inc., 238
N.L.R.B. 116 (1978) (employee's dual role as supervisor and sole union steward ruled an
unfair labor practice; failure of union to process grievance of employee whose recall was
prevented by same union steward ruled a breach of DFR); Alcoa Constr. Sys. Inc., 212
N.L.R.B. 452 (1974) (union causing discharge of employee for failure to pay union dues
held a violation of DFR; employer's compliance with union demand held an unfair labor
practice).
16. The National Labor Relations Board has curtailed entertainment of hybrid DFR
suits. The current Reagan-appointed majority has used its unreviewable discretion to hear
only DFR suits solely against a union.
17. The Supreme Court had to first knock down various procedural barriers. See infra
notes 51-62 & note 231 and accompanying text.
18. Damages are awarded under § 301 when tied to a § 303 damages action, 29
U.S.C. § 187. For a discussion of the scope of a damage award, see Bowen v. United States
Postal Service, 459 U.S. 212 (1983); infra notes 160-184 and accompanying text.
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dards applied by the Supreme Court preceeds a survey of standards applied by the circuit courts of appeal and district courts. The
prerequisites to a section 301 DFR action, exhaustion of internal union
and contractual remedies, will be addressed as they represent affirmative
defenses for an employer in a hybrid suit. The final section will address
the issue of damages in section 301 actions, recently addressed by the
Supreme Court. Throughout this note, section 301 actions will be emphasized as a more fruitful avenue of relief for the wrongfully discharged and inadequately represented employee, as section 301 affords
each claimant his "day in court" and offers greater remedial relief than
complaints instituted before the Board.
I.

A.

ORIGINS OF THE

DuTy

OF FAIR REPRESENTATION

Contract Negotiations

In 1935, the American labor movement received significant impetus
when Congress passed the Wagner Act, 19 which recognized:
that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and
bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury . . . by

encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment
of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages,
hours, working conditions, and by restoring equality
of bar20
gaining power between employers and employees.
To achieve this end, the Act authorized the information of labor organi21
zations to represent employees' interests vis a vis their employers.
Labor organizations presented a strong, united front, wielding the
collective power of all the employees of a particular craft. As exclusive
collective bargaining agent, 22 the union represented the collective interest, necessarily at the expense of individual employees whose views or
positions did not coincide with the majority. The duty of fair representation emerged as a judicially-created doctrine, imposing the statutory
23
obligation of fair representation.
The Supreme Court first articulated the duty in the seminal case of
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. 24 Arising under the Railway Labor
Act, 2 5 Steele involved black employees who, excluded from a union's
membership because of their race, were nevertheless forced to accept
19. Ch. 372, 49 Star. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168
(1982)).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
21. Section 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982), guarantees workers the rights to
join, form or assist a union, to bargain collectively, and to engage in concerted activities.
22. Id. § 159(a).
23. Steele, 323 U.S. at 202.
24. Id. at 192.
25. Ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1962) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1982)).
Supreme Court cases involving racial discrimination under the RLA and considering the
duty of fair representation include Conley, 355 U.S. 41; Graham v. Bhd. of Locomotive
Firemen & Engineermen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343
U.S. 768 (1952). Cf Syres v. Oil Workers, Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) (per curiam)
(DFR arising under the NLRA).
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the union as exclusive bargaining representative, because the majority in
their craft were white. 26 The "Brotherhood" negotiated a seniority
agreement with several railroads "amend[ing] the existing bargaining
agreement in such manner as ultimately to exclude all negro fireman
from the service."' 2 7 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by ChiefJustice
Stone, announced the substance of a union's duty by first comparing it
with a legislature. "The representative is clothed with power not unlike
that of a legislature which is subject to constitutional limitations on its
power to deny, restrict, destroy or discriminate against the rights of
those for whom it legislates, and is under an affirmative constitutional
duty to protect those rights."'2 8 Then interpreting the congressional intent underlying the RLA, the Court went on to set the standard of conduct, "a bargaining labor organization . . . [must] represent non-union
or minority union members of the craft without hostile discrimination,
fairly, impartially, and in good faith."' 29 Yet acknowledging that it was
engaged in a balancing of interests, the Court added: "This does not
mean a statutory representative of a craft is barred from making contracts which may have unfavorable effects on some members of the craft
represented." ' 30 This latter statement served as a prudential caveat, mitigating the effects of a precedent that could have opened the doors to
hasty and widespread judicial intervention in the settlement of labor
disputes.
The Steele decision, arising in the context of the RLA, reflects the
thrust of most early DFR cases; to impose an obligation on unions to
represent minorities fairly. 3 1 Yet, on the very same day that Steele was
decided, the Court extended DFR to cases not involving racial discrimination, and to unions certified under the NLRA. Wallace v. NLRB 3 2 involved a labor dispute in which two labor organizations were vying for a
position as exclusive bargaining representative at a particular company
plant. Following a consent election (as provided in the agreement approved by the NLRB), labor organization "A" emerged as sole bargaining representative. "A" signed a closed shop agreement with the intent
to refuse membership to union "B's" members, thus effecting their discharge. 33 In an unfair labor practice proceeding3 4 before the Board, the
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Steele, 323 U.S. at 194-95.
Id. at 195.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 204.
Id. at 203.
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
323 U.S. 248 (1944).
Id. at 250.
When the breach of a union's duty of fair representation amounts to an unfair

labor practice under § 8 of the NLRA, the Supreme Court at one time held that the doc-

trine of preemption vests exclusive jurisdiction of the controversy in the NLRB. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959). But see Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171, 180 (1967) (Garmon's broad preemption doctrine does not divest federal
courts ofjurisdiction where it could not fairly be inferred that Congress intended exclusive
jurisdiction to lie with the Board); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962) (suit
brought under § 301 which is also an unfair labor practice under § 8 can be heard by a
state court and is not preempted by Garmon).
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NLRB found that the company had a hand in formation of union "A" to
frustrate union "B's" attempts to unionize the plant, and further that the
union-shop agreement was implemented to facilitate the discharge of
"B's" employees. 3 5 The Board ordered disestablishment of union "A",
nullification of the union-shop contract, and reinstatement with back pay
for forty-three employees.3 6 In affirming the Board's order, the
Supreme Court held that as exclusive bargaining representative, the labor organization is the agent of all the employees, not just the group
members "charged with the responsibility of representing their interests
fairly and impartially."

37

Although the language in Wallace was sufficiently analogous to Steele
to convey the Supreme Court's intent, the specific standard articulated
in Steele was not applied to a union certified under the NLRA until Ford
Motor Co. v. Huffman.3 8 In Huffman, union members whose seniority was
affected attacked the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement
that enabled the employer to credit to an employee's seniority any preemployment military service.3 9 In addressing the Steele standard, 40 the
Court further defined the parameters of its application: "A wide range
of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative
in serving the unit it represents, subject always to good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion." '4 ' The Court went on
to hold that the union was within its reasonable discretion and authority
to negotiate such an agreement, and that such a provision was further
42
supported by considerations of public policy and industrial stability.

B.

Contract Administration

Seizing the rule announced by the Supreme Court in Steele, the Fifth
Circuit quickly extended the duty of fair representation beyond the mere
negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement. In Hughes Tool v.
NLRB, 43 the circuit court noted the distinction between a union's role in
negotiating a contract and that in processing a grievance, interpreting
the NLRA as not granting the union the exclusive right to process an
employee's grievance; the employee could present the grievance himself.44 However, the basis of the union's DFR in Hughes was somewhat
35. Wallace, 323 U.S. at 250.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 255.
38. 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
39. Id. at 331. A credit for post-employment military service was statutory. Selective
Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885, 890 (1940). A similar provision is
now codified at 38 U.S.C. 2024 (1982).
40. 345 U.S. at 337.
41. Id. at 338.
42. Id. at 338-43.
43. 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945) ([A] union certified as exclusive bargaining representative brought a complaint to the Board seeking enforcement of its role in light of an
employer's concurrent deduction of union dues from the salaries of another union's members. The Board issued a cease and desist order to the employer and the case came before
the circuit court for enforcement of the order.).
44. Id. at 72-73. Note however, that through a collective bargaining agreement, a
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questionable. The Court maintained that by certifying the union as bargaining representative a "trust" was created from which the duty could
45
be imposed.
Twelve years later, the Supreme Court, in Conley v. Gibson 4 6 (a case
arising under the RLA), elaborated on the Fifth Circuit's formulation,
eliminating the potentially suspect reliance on the word "trust", and instead attributing the source of the duty to a continuing obligation emanating from the collective bargaining agreement: "The bargaining
representative's duty. . . does not come to an abrupt end . . . with the
making of an agreement between union and employer. Collective bar47
gaining is a continuous process."
Although the Supreme Court affirmed that a union's DFR is a continuing obligation by extending its application to grievance administration, Professor Cox noted that the role the Court was assuming,
evaluation of the merits of a grievance, was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Railroad Adjustment Board. 48 Yet effective enforcement of
the duty seemingly compelled the Court's intrusion into the administrative process. Acknowledgement of the need for judicial intervention
prompted the creation of a new DFR remedy, the section 301 hybrid
suit.

49

II.

GRIEVANCE ADMINISTRATION AND SECTION

301

Section 301 requires a breach of contract for any claim brought
under its auspices to be heard. 50 Usually, breach of the collective bargaining agreement is the underlying allegation.
Initially, the major obstacle to DFR claims arising under section 301
was the doctrine of preemption. 5 1 Essentially, preemption divested state
and federal courts of jurisdiction over DFR claims, because they fell
under the heading of "unfair labor practices" under the NLRA, and consequently, were subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. 5 2 Yet,
union can be certified as exclusive bargaining representative of the employee in grievance
proceedings, 29 U.S.C. 159(a) (1982).
45. Id. at 74 (dictum).
46. 355 U.S. 41 (1957) (involving the wrongful discharge of black railroad employees
and the union's failure to protect them from wrongful, allegedly discriminatory discharge
as provided in the collective bargaining agreement).
47. Id. at 46.
48. Cox, Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court at the October Term, 1957, 44 VA. L. REV.

1057, 1088 (1958).
49. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
50. See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), (b) (1982).
51.

In Miranda Fuel, 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2nd

Cir. 1963), the Board, over a vigorous dissent, held that a breach of the duty of fair representation amounted to an unfair labor practice under § 8(b)(2) and 8(b)(3) of the NLRA.
The Supreme Court had applied preemption to cases "arguably" constituting unfair labor
practices under § 8, deferring to the jurisdiction of the Board. See Garmon, 359 U.S. 236;
Weber v. Anheuser Busch, 348 U.S. 468 (1955); Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485
(1953). However, the Supreme Court refused to divest the courts of their jurisdiction over
DFR claims, and consequently, using § 301, established concurrent jurisdiction with the
Board over such claims. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 179.
52. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982).
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in a series of cases, the Supreme Court gradually relaxed the rigid construction of the doctrine to suits arising in contract under section 301.53
In this context of increased judicial intervention to protect the
rights of individual employees, the Supreme Court considered a union's
duty of fair representation in the context of hybrid section 301 suit for
the first time. Humphrey v. Moore54 involved two companies whose employees were represented by one union. 55 The two companies were engaged in the transportation of new automobiles from a Ford Motor
Company plant in Kentucky, but a decline in business reduced the need
to only one. 5 6 The ensuing agreement between the two transport companies provided that only one firm was to assume Ford's business, creating a precarious situation for the employees of the other firm. 5 7 The
worried employees filed a grievance claiming the two firms should be
"sandwiched" to reflect the seniority enjoyed by the employees at their
respective firms. 58 As provided in the collective bargaining agreement,
the grievance was settled by a joint conference committee which sandwiched the seniority lists, but since one company was younger than the
59
other, the younger company's employees lost seniority.
In the Kentucky state court, employee Moore and others sought an
60
unjunction to prevent implementation of the committee's decision.
Citing FordMotor Co. v. Huffman and Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, the Supreme
Court found no breach of the union's statutory duty, finding that the
decision to dovetail the lists was made "honestly, in good faith and without hostility or arbitrary discrimination," affording the union "a wide
range of reasonableness in the exercise of its discretion." 6 1 Accordingly
relief was denied.
The Court, without reducing the rule to words, laid a procedural
foundation in Humphrey v. Moore for subsequent DFR hybrid suits under
section 301 which required a plaintiff to prove a breach of the union's
duty as a prerequisite to any award suit against an employer for breach
of contract. The procedural requirement derived from Humphrey struck
a reasonable balance of interests in section 301 suits alleging a union
breach of DFR and an employer's breach of contract. By requiring an
employee to prove a breach of his representative's duty of fair represen53. The Supreme Court first ensured that § 301 claims could be heard in state courts,
see Smith, 371 U.S. 195; Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962);
Dowd Box v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962). In Vaca, 386 U.S. at 182-83. the Court interpreted the congressional intent underlying the Taft-Hartley Act as emphasizing the rights
of the wronged employee over and above the preservation of the statutory dispute resolution mechanism: "The existence of even a small group of cases in which the Board would
be unwilling or unable to remedy a union's breach of duty would frustrate the basic purposes underlying the duty of fair representation doctrine."
54. 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
55. Id. at 336.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 337.
58. Id.
59. Id.at 337-39.
60. Id at 340-42.
61. Id.at 350.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 62:2

tation, the federal labor policy providing for a final and binding independent system of dispute resolution is preserved in that dissatisfied
employees cannot directly attack the resolution of their arbitrated claim.
On the other hand, employees who present legitimate grievances to arbitration but find themselves without relief because of union misconduct
have access to an independent tribunal as recourse.
Yet despite Humphrey's accommodation of competing interests in a
section 301 hybrid suit, the viability of a DFR claim under section 301
remained an open question. Three years later, in the landmark case of
Vaca v. Sipes, 62 the Supreme Court established the section 301 hybrid
suit as an avenue of relief, affording an employee review of a claim
against an employer and a union by an independent and unbiased
tribunal.
III.

STANDARDS

A union's duty to represent a craft fairly extends, as previously
noted from contract negotiation to contract administration. 63 However,
although the duty extends uniformly throughout the representative process, the standards applied by the courts do not. Clearly, a different set
of standards is applied to determine the occurrence of a breach of the
duty of fair representation in the context of contract administration than
contract negotiation. 64
When negotiating a contract, a union is accorded "a wide range of
reasonableness . . . subject always to good faith and honesty in the exercise of its discretion." 65 Such is the case, because necessarily, when
negotiating a contract, certain members of a craft not in the majority
must have their interests subjugated for the sake of a strong united
front. However, a wrongfully discharged employee must rely on the
union's exclusive representation and advocacy of his claim as generally
provided for in the collective bargaining agreement. In contract administration via the grievance procedure, the courts found it necessary to
curb the discretion afforded the union in contract negotiation, because
the union's role is considerably more ministerial than discretionary in
the administration of a grievance. Therefore, in this context, a union
breaches the duty of fair representation when its conduct is "arbitrary. ' 66 This pronouncement of the standard in Vaca v. SipeS67 has
spawned much litigation and confusion. The section following will ad62. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
63. See supra notes 19-49 and accompanying text.
64.

The distinction was first recognized by the court in Hughes Tool v. NLRB, 147

F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945). Humphrey, 375 U.S. 335 established an objective component to
the standard announced in Steele supra note 28. For a discussion of this distinction see Leftier, Piercing the Duty of Fair Representation: The Dichotomy Between Negotiations and Grievance
Handling, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 35 (1979); Note, The Duty of Fair Representation: The Emerging
Standardof the Union's Duty in the Context of Negligent, Arbitrary or Perfunctory Grievance Adminis-

tration, 46 Mo. L. REV. 142 (1981).
65. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
66. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
67. Id.
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dress the few Supreme Court decisions regarding standards in the context of grievance administration, which will be followed by a summary of
the current struggle of the lower courts to arrive at some uniformity of
interpretation.
A.

The Supreme Court and a Standardfor Union Conduct in Contract
Administration

The Supreme Court has done little to remedy the confusion created
by Vaca v. Sipes. 6 8 Many trees have consequently been sacrificed to accommodate the literature devoted to identifying a standard by which
union conduct should be judged. 6 9 Nevertheless, all of the standards
can trace their origins to Steele v. Louisville and Nashville R.R.
applied
Co. 70 Steele imposed on unions a duty to represent their craft "without
71
Applying
hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith."
the
negotiainvolved
(Steele
administration
this formulation to contract
no
breach
find
would
courts
agreement),
tion of a collective bargaining
was
the
representation
as
as
long
fairly
of a union's duty to represent
72
subjeca
involved
applied,
as
standard,
This
carried out in good faith.
tive determination of what constituted good faith. The focus of the in73
quiry changed with the Supreme Court's opinion in Humphrey v. Moore.
Justice White, in dictum, addressed as a relevant consideration that "the
union took its position honestly, in good faith and without hostility or
arbitrary discrimination." 74 The introduction of the word "arbitrary"
hinted that the Court saw fit to initiate a new area of inquiry when evaluating a union's decision of whether to process a grievance. More significantly, this new area of inquiry suggested that in addition to the
prevalent subjective standard of good faith, within which a union must
exercise its discretion, a new standard, that of arbitrariness, was emerging as a judicial criterion of a union's duty of fair representation when
processing a grievance.
The "hint" turned into law in 1967 when the Supreme Court decided Vaca v. Sipes. 7 5 In Vaca, an employee of a meat packing plant was
discharged because of poor health. 76 A grievance was filed and
68. Id. See infra notes 75-87 and accompanying text.
69. For example, in addition to numerous court opinions, see, Vandervelde, A Fair
Process Modelfor the Union's Fair RepresentationDuty, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1079 (1983); Note, The
Duty of FairRepresentationAfter Hoffman v. Lonza: In Search of a Proper Standardfor Reviewing
Union Representation in the Grievance Process, 1983 Wis. L REV. 1505 (1983); Note, The Emerging Standardof the Union's Duty in the Context of Negligent Arbitrary or Perfunctory Grievance Administration, 46 Mo. L. REv. 142 (1981); Steinhauer, IBEW v. Foust: A Hint of Negligence in the

Duty of Fair Representation, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1041 (1981); Leffler, Piercing the Duty of Fair
Representation: The Dichotomy Between Negotiationsand Grievance Handling, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 35

(1979).
70.
71.
72.
73.
62 and
74.
75.
76.

323 U.S. 192 (1944).
Id. at 204.
See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
375 U.S. 335 (1964). For a discussion of the facts of this case see supra notes 55accompanying text.
Id. at 350 (emphasis added).
386 U.S. 171.
Id. at 174-175.

636
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processed through the third and fourth steps as provided in the collective bargaining agreement. 77 When the union tried to obtain better
medical evidence by sending the employee to another doctor, the examination proved futile to support the employee's position, and the union
did not take the grievance to arbitration. 78 The employee then brought
a hybrid section 301 suit in a Missouri trial court. 79 The Supreme
Court, in reviewing the union's conduct, applied the following standard:
"A breach of the statutory duty of fair representation occurs only when a
union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is
arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." 8 0
The standard, as the Court noted, 8 ' struck a balance between an
employee's right to have a grievance submitted to arbitration, and a
union's discretion to determine what grievances will go to arbitration.
The primary concern is to preserve an individual employee's rights and
dignity while insuring the smooth and proper functioning of the grievance machinery as provided in the statutory scheme and the collective
bargaining agreement. As the Court observed in Vaca, it is important to
preserve union discretion regarding the decision to process a grievance,
because "the employer's [ensuing lack of] confidence in the union's authority [would return] . . . the individual grievant to the vagaries of independent and unsystematic negotiation.' '82

In Vaca, the Supreme Court gave few indications as to what constituted arbitrary conduct. It was however clear that an employee did not
have an absolute right to have a grievance submitted to arbitration, 3
and if a union settles a grievance short of arbitration, it has not necessarily breached its DFR. 8 4 Additionally, a finding by a court that a particular grievance had merit would not necessarily disturb a union's good
faith determination that it was not meritorious.8 5 However, a perfunctory decision not to process the grievance or the union's disregard of an
86
employee's complaint would establish a breach of DFR.
The standard promulgated by Vaca became known as the three-pronged standard. 8 7 It is the subject of frequent citation and interpreta77. Id. at 175.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 176. State courts as well as federal can entertain § 301 suits, see Smith, 371

U.S. 195.
80. 386 U.S. at 190 (citing Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335; and Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330.

81. 386 U.S. at 190-191.
82. Id. at 191.
83. Id. at 191-192.
84. Id. at 192.
85. Id. at 193, 195. See also infra note 102 and accompanying text.
86. Id. at 194. This guideline from Vaca has evolved into the rational decision making
standard. See infra notes 104-112 and accompanying text.
87. Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 309-310 (6th Cir. 1975) (citing
Griffin v. Int'l Union of United Auto. Workers, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1974)).
A union must conform its behavior to each of these three separate standards.
First it must treat all factions and segments of its membership without hostility or
discrimination. Next, the broad discretion of the union in asserting the rights of
its individual members must be exercised in complete good faith and honesty.
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tion, spurning a legacy of litigation in lower courts striving for
homogeny. Despite several other Supreme Court decisions addressing
the standard, uniformity as yet, has not been realized, suggesting an intention of the Court to delegate to the circuit courts the task of determining their own standards derived from general Supreme Court
guidelines.
Vaca had seemingly laid down a liberal path for courts to follow.
Yet, in Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge,8 8 the Court qualified Vaca's
pronouncement of the arbitrariness standard by asserting that "[tihere
must be 'substantial evidence of fraud, deceitful action or dishonest conduct.' -89 Placing a greater burden on an employee alleging a breach of
a union's DFR, the Court added that the plaintiff would to show "substantial evidence of discrimination that is intentional, severe, and unrelated to legitimate union objectives" to prevail on such a claim. Lockridge
represents one extreme of the interpretation of the Vaca standard; however, in terms of the Supreme Court's view, Lockridge proved anomalous.
In Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. ,90 the Court returned to the
Vaca standard absent Lockridge's evidentiary requirement of union malice, "in Vaca 'we accept[ed] the proposition that a union may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory
fashion.' "91 In so doing the Supreme Court certified the anomalous
character of Lockridge. Yet still the Lockridge standard lives on today in
the Seventh Circuit.

92

In further support of the Vaca-Hines formulation of the standard, the
Supreme Court in Electrical Workers v. Foust9 3 cited Vaca, Hines and
Humphrey when alluding to the proposition stated above in Hines, omitting
reference to Lockridge.94 Accordingly, in Del Costello v. InternationalBroth96
erhood of Teamsters,95 the omission was again repeated.
The Supreme Court has left little doubt that arbitrary or perfunctory handling of a grievance is a breach of a union's DFR, but what constitutes "arbitrary" or "perfunctory" conduct? The subject of much
litigation, this determination has been left to the various lower courts
that entertain DFR claims. The following is a summary of the current
Finally, the union must avoid arbitrary conduct. Each of these requirements represents a distinct and separate obligation, the breach of which may constitute the
basis of a civil action.
The Ruzicka court concluded that arbitrary conduct need not be motivated by bad faith,
and pioneered the application of a negligence standard to the union's DFR in grievance

administration. 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975).
88. 403 U.S. 274 (1970).
89.

Id. at 299 (quoting Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 348 (1964)).

90. 424 U.S. 554 (1975).
91. Id. at 568-69 (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967)).
92. See Hoffman v. Lonza, Inc., 658 F.2d 519, 520-22 (7th Cir. 1981), Rupe v. Spector
Freight Sys. Inc., 679 F.2d 685, 691-92 (7th Cir. 1982); Superczynski v. P.T.O. Services,

Inc., 706 F.2d 200, 203 (7th Cir. 1983); Dober v. Roadway Express, Inc., 707 F.2d 292,
294-95 (7th Cir. 1983).
93. 442 U.S. 42 (1978).
94. Id. at 47.
95. 103 S. Ct. 2281 (1983).
96. Id. at 2290.
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state of the law in section 301 actions occurring in the wake of the Vaca
formulation of the standard for the breach of a union's DFR in the context of grievance administration.
B.

Current Standards

It is entirely possible that the courts are unequal to the task
of striking the proper balance between these many
interests
97
and their infinite permutations and combinations.
Three trends have emerged in the various lower court's interpretation of the Vaca standard. The first and most prevalent will be referred
to as the adequate procedure standard.9 8 The second trend can be attributed to reliance on Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge,99 and is characterized by an evidentiary showing of intentional, invidious or bad faith
conduct. The third trend is best described as a negligence standard (for
want of a better term) which constitutes a breach of DFR when negligent
conduct is compounded with a particular pressing circumstance to
render the conduct so negligent as to be arbitrary.
1. The Adequate Procedure Standard
The adequate procedure standard, in addition to being the most
prevalent approach in the courts to date, is probably the fairest standard
applied by the courts to determine a breach of a union's DFR. It preserves efficiency and good faith union discretion, while affording the employee a reasonable representation. Its fairness is a function of its
flexibility, and consequently, it is difficult to isolate a single, all-encompassing standard of conduct.
Initially, following the language of Vaca, 10 0 a union must make a
good faith determination of a grievance's merit, thereby preserving the
97. Fourteen years after Vaca, Circuit Judge Cudahy arrived at this hardly startling
insight. Baker v. Amstead Industries, Inc., 656 F.2d 1245, 1252 (7th Cir. 1981).
98. For a theoretical discussion of an analogous model, see Vandervelde, A FairProcess
Modelfor a Union's Fair Representation Duty, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1079 (1983). At this juncture,
it would be beneficial to address the recent standards applied by the Board. The NLRB
has refrained from hearing "hybrid" DFR claims as unfair labor practices since 1980. See
supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. However, many DFR suits brought solely
against a union are heard under § 8(b)(I)(A) of the Act. See Southern N.Y. Area Local
American Postal Workers Union, 266 N.L.R.B. 317 (1983) (refusal to process a grievance
because an employee is not a member of the local is an arbitrary decision and a breach of
DFR under § 8(b)(l)(A)); Clerks and Lumber Handlers Local 939, 269 N.L.R.B. No. 71,
1983-84 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 16,229 (1984) (having obtained legal advice and relying on
an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, a union's decision not to process
a grievance is not arbitrary); Office and Professional Employees Local 2, 268 N.L.R.B. No.
207, 1983-84 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 16,136 (1984) (looking to totality of the circumstances
to determine if failure to notify member of decision not to process is arbitrary; negligence
alone does not constitute arbitrary conduct); San Francisco Web Pressman and
Platemakers Union, 267 N.L.R.B. 451 (1983) (failure to investigate was a departure of past
union practice that amounted to a breach of DFR under § 8(b)(l)(A)); Local 282 Teamsters, 267 NLRB 1130 (1983) (failure to notify employees of changes in seniority requirements was an allirmiative decision without rational basis, therefore arbitrary and a breach
of DFR).
99. See supa notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
100. "[AJ unuion must, in good faith and in a non-arbitrary manner, make decisions as
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expediency of the process by weeding out those grievances that are not
meritorious.' 0 ' However, the fact that a grievance may later be found
by a court to be meritorious does not establish a breach of DFR. 10 2 A
union's decision not to process a grievance, cannot be based on consid10 3
erations other than merit, for instance, seniority.
It follows that to make a good faith determination of the merit of a
grievance, a union cannot base that determination on arbitrary factors;
consequently, some courts have held that a union's decision not to proceed with a grievance must have a rational basis. 10 4 In Robesky v. Qantas
Empire Airways, Ltd., 1 5 the Ninth Circuit laid a precedent which established various components of the adequate process standard that have
been subsequently adopted by other circuits.
Robesky involved the discharge of a reservation sales agent for inadequate performance. 10 6 After the grievance procedure was exhausted,
the union decided not to take her grievance to arbitration, then failed to
inform Robesky of the decision. 10 7 Robesky's ignorance led her to reject an offer of settlement she would have otherwise accepted.' 0 8 The
court dismissed the claim against the company, holding that she was discharged for cause, without a breach of the collective bargaining contract. 10 9 However, as against the union, the court held that because
Robesky's company had made her an offer of settlement, the failure to
inform her of the decision not to go to arbitration was without rational
basis.I' 0 In addition, the Ninth Circuit ruled that unintentional acts or
omissions "may be arbitrary if [1] 'they reflect reckless disregard for the
rights of the individual employee . . . [2] they severely prejudice the
to the merits of particular grievances." 386 U.S. at 194 (citing Humphrey v. Moore, 375
U.S. at 349-50, and Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. at 337-39).
101. "[Flrivolous grievances are ended prior to the most costly and time-consuming
step in the grievance procedures." 386 U.S. at 191.
102. 386 U.S. at 193; Sanders v. Youthcraft Coats, Inc., 700 F.2d 1226, 1229 (8th Cir.
1983); Seymour v. Olin Corp., 666 F.2d 202, 208 (5th Cir. 1982); Findley v. Jones Motor
Freight, 639 F.2d 953, 958 (3d Cir. 1981); Turner v. Air Transp. Dispatchers' Ass'n, 468
F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1972); Bazarte v. United Transp. Union, 429 F.2d 868, 872 (3d Cir.
1970). Compare Gregg v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Union Local 150, 699 F.2d
10"15, 1016 (9th Cir. 1983) ("The more important and meritorious the grievance, the more
substantial the reason must be to justify abandoning it"); Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways, Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082, 1092 (6th Cir. 1978) ("In determining whether a union's handling of a grievance is arbitrary or perfunctory, the trial court should consider whether the
grievance lacked merit.") (Kennedy, J., concurring); Harrison v. United Transp. Union,
530 F.2d 558, 561 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976) (proofofa grievance's
merit is circumstantial evidence that a failure to process claim constituted bad faith).
103. Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229, 1239 (10th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied sub noma.United Steelworkers v. Smith, 449 U.S. 839 (1980).
104. Gregg v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Union Local 150, 699 F.2d 1015,
1016 (9th Cir. 1983) (decision lacking rational basis is arbitrary); Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways, Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082, 1089 (6th Cir. 1978); Matos v. Aeronaves de Mexico,
S.A., 548 F. Supp. 933, 938-39 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Stephens v. Teamsters Local 2707, Airline, Aerospace and Allied Employees, 504 F. Supp. 332, 334-35 (W.D. Wash. 1980).
105. 573 F.2d 1082 (9th Cir. 1978).
106. Id. at 1084.
107. Id. at 1085.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1091. See supra note 104 for cases addressing this rule.
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injured employee . . . and [3] the policies underlying the duty of fair

representation will not be served by shielding the union from liability in
the circumstance of the particular case.' "'II
Focusing on whether the union's failure to inform Robesky was
made rationally, the court simply decided whether "the procedures followed in the handling of the grievance were adequate."'12 Essentially,
for the purposes of review, the court refrained from granting union discretion its usual deference, saying that a union is subject to "the kind of
scrutiny we use whenever we review a determination by an individual or
body entrusted with discretionary power."' 113 Such statements epitomize the role of the courts in applying the adequate procedure standard.
In Robesky, a failure to give notice constituted a breach of the
union's DFR. However, a failure to notify an employee of a union decision is not always a breach of the duty. The determinative factor in most
cases is whether the union's failure to notify the employee significantly
affected the employee's situation. For instance, in Warehouse Union Local
860, InternationalBrotherhoodof Teamsters v. NLRB, 114 the court held that a
union's failure to advise membership of prior threats of job loss if demanded wage increases were granted, amounted to a breach of the
union's duty.' 15 Accordingly, a failure to notify an employee of the
scheduled date of an arbitration hearing is also a breach of DFR. 1 16 But
where a grievance was abandoned because an employee was rightfully
discharged, the failure to notify the employee did not constitute a
breach of DFR. 117 In a recent questionable ruling, a union's conduct
was not considered arbitrary when the union made a conscious decision
not to inform employees of a forthcoming plant closing. The court in
Abbington v. Dayton Malleable, Inc.,i 18 concluded that to notify employees
of an uncertain plant closing would "needlessly worry" employees and
therefore was "well-founded." 19
Finally, some failure to notify decisions turn on whether the conduct was intentional. In Harrison v. United TransportationUnion,120 a case
arising under the RLA, a union's willful decision not to notify Harrison
of the abandonment of his grievance, allowing a time period to expire,
foreclosed his individual pursuit of the claim. 12 l In addition, since the
111.

Id. at 1090.

112. Id. at 1092 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
113. Id.
114. 652 F.2d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
115. Id. at 1025.
116. Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229, 1241 (8th Cir. 1980).
117. Bazarte v. United Transp. Union, 429 F.2d 868, 872 (3d Cir. 1970).
118. 561 F. Supp. 1290 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
119. Id. at 1300.
120. 530 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1975).
121. Harrison's employer offered to reinstate another employer whose grievance was
pending if the union did not proceed with Harrison's grievance. 530 F.2d at 560. Such a
"trading" of grievances does not amount to a breach of DFR if the trade was an exercise of
good faith union discretion. However, "trading" grievances might constitute a breach if
concerted, discriminatory conduct is shown.
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union was obliged by its bylaws, a breach of DFR was found. 122 Conversely, in Hoffman v. Lonza, Inc. 123 a union that failed to give timely notice because it "forgot" was relieved of liability because the employer
failed to show intentional invidious conduct that was directed at the employee. 124 Notwithstanding the evidentiary requirement of the Seventh
Circuit, courts have consistently found a breach of DFR when, in the
words of Robesky, union procedures "severely prejudice the injured employee" or "reflect reckless disregard for the rights of the individual
25
employee."1
Another frequently litigated aspect of the adequate procedure standard is the duty to investigate. This duty is intimately connected with an
informed, "rational" decision on the merits of a grievance discussed
above. In De Arroyo v. Sindicato de TrabajadoresPackinghouse,126 the failure
to investigate led the court to conclude that the union's judgment on the
merits of a grievance was arbitrary.12 7 Any court that applies a rational
decisionmaking standard is likely to find a breach of DFR when a union
fails to investigate the merits of a grievance.
Several other areas within the adequate procedure model require
discussion. A union has been found not to have breached its duty of fair
28
representation for merely misunderstanding a legal burden of proof, 1

or for a failure to raise an argument or call a witness when representing
an employee. 129 Similarly, a union's failure to provide a transcript or
lawyer to an employee has been held to not be a cause for a breach of
the duty. 130 However, when a union engages in needless correspondence to ascertain whether a lawyer had received authorization from an
employee, thereby allowing the deadline for filing a grievance to expire,
a breach of DFR was found. 13 1 A union has been absolved of DFR liaa breach, but conformed
bility when its conduct might have constituted
32
to the union's past prevailing practice.1
2.

The Seventh Circuit's Standard

The Seventh Circuit, seemingly satisfied with the evidentiary requirement of intentional, invidious or bad faith conduct espoused by
Lockridge, 133 has never acknowledged Lockridge's omission from citations
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 561-562.
658 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 520-522.
Robeshy, 573 F.2d at 1090.
425 F.2d 281 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970).
Id. at 284. See also Freeman v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 609 F.2d 1123, 1128 (5th Cir.

1980) (dictum), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 883 (1980); Turner v. Air Transp. Dispatchers' Ass'n,
468 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1972).

128. Poole v. Budd Co., 706 F.2d 181, 185 (6th Cir. 1983).
129. Findley v. Jones Motor Freight, 639 F.2d 953, 958-960
130. Grovner v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 625 F.2d 1289, 1291
131. Foust v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 572 F.2d 710, 715
442 U.S. 42 (1978) (modified as to damage award).
132. Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 1207, 1212
259 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1281 (1983).
133. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.

(3d Cir. 1981).
(5th Cir. 1980).
(10th Cir. 1978), modified,
(6th Cir.), af'd, 707 F.2d
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in subsequent Supreme Court DFR decisions. By refraining from expressly overruling Lockridge, the Supreme Court has essentially condoned the Seventh Circuit's interpretation.
In Hoffman v. Lonza, Inc. ,134 an employee filed a DFR suit under section 301 of the Act because his union forgot to file a timely notice of
appeal, resulting in the dismissal of his grievance.' 3 5 The court held
that more than a mere showing of a failure to properly process a grievance is required to establish a breach of DFR. 136 Quoting Lockridge, the
court added the evidentiary requirement to the plaintiffs burden of
proof mandating he show "substantial evidence of discrimination that is
13 7
intentional, severe, and unrelated to legitimate union objectives."'
The rationale for application of the standard was to minimize the possibility of union-employee collusion in the recovery of damages. 13 8 Apparently, the court believes that collusive DFR suits are more prevalent
than legitimate claims, and that the discovery of collusion outweighs the
need for retribution of individual employees. Clearly, the new burden
frustrates the underlying purpose of the doctrine.
Hoffman v. Lonza, Inc. has been followed by the Seventh Circuit in
40
several subsequent decisions. 139 In Superczynski v. P.T. 0. Services, Inc., 1
the court finally acknowledged the severe burden they imposed on an
employee, and graciously deferred jurisdiction falling below their standard to the NLRB. "Complaints about conduct that is not deliberately
discriminatory or arbitrary, or in bad faith are within the jurisdiction of
the National Labor Relations Board."' 14 1 Considering that section 301
breach of contract actions are not always "unfair labor practices", this
alternative is not, in every instance, viable. In addition, the NLRB is
more limited in terms of damage awards. 142 Finally, if the Board's decision is unfavorable to the employee, he can only appeal the Board's decision to the local circuit court."1 4 3 In the Seventh Circuit such appeals
apparently would be futile. One redemming aspect of the Seventh Circuit's approach is that the interests of finality and exclusivity of the
grievance machinery are truly preserved.
3.

The Negligence Standard

An overwhelming number of courts require more than negligent
conduct to establish a breach of DFR. 14 4 Application of such a lenient
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

658 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 520.
Id.
Id. at 522.
Id.
See supra note 92.
706 F.2d 200 (7th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 203.
See infra notes 155-184 and accompanying text.
29 U.S.C. § 160() (1982).

144.

See Rupe v. Spector Freight Systems, 679 F.2d 685, 691-692 (7th Cir. 1982);

Farmer v. ARA Services, Inc., 660 F.2d 1096, 1103 (6th Cir. 1981); Wyatt v. Interstate &
Ocean Transp. Co., 623 F.2d 888, 890 (4th Cir. 1980); Larry v. Penn Truck Aids, Inc., 567
F. Supp. 1410, 1413-1414 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Monroe v. Int'l. Union UAW, 540 F. Supp. 249,
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standard would enable the courts to intrude excessively into the dispute
resolution machinery. However, some courts have nevertheless found
that negligent conduct can be arbitrary or perfunctory. For example, in
Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 1 45 the Sixth Circuit found that a union's
inexplicable neglect in not taking an employee's grievance to a third
stage of processing combined with a subsequent failure to notify the employee and the company of its inaction was "negligent handling.., unrelated . . . to the merits . .

.

of the case . . . (constituting) a clear

example of arbitrary and perfunctory handling of a grievance." 146 Ultimately however, in a sequence of litigation that spanned eight years Ruzicka's relief was denied, 14 7 and in so doing, the court rejected its
1 48
original formulation of the negligence standard of union conduct.
Nevertheless, the negligence standard still lives. All courts now
agree that simple negligence does not amount to a breach of a union's
duty, yet when combined with compelling circumstances, a breach of
DFR has been found. ' 49 In Dutrisac v. CaterpillarTractor Co. ,150 the court
held, "where there has been a determination that a grievance is meritorious and the union negligently misses a time limit resulting in depriving
the employee of access to the mandatory grievance dispute process, the
union acted arbitrarily and so has breached its duty of fair representation." 15 1 Consider also Brown v. International Union, United Auto, Aerospace
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, 15 2 in which the court found
that a union's negligent failure to monitor a pension fund amounted to a
breach of its duty of fair representation,1 5 3 but because the deficit in the
pension fund was not connected with the union's failure to monitor the
154
fund, the claim was dismissed.
As with all cases alleging negligence, the existence of a duty is a
prerequisite to a finding that conduct was negligent. In the few recent
cases establishing negligent conduct as arbitrary, and therefore a breach
of DFR, the circumstance must give rise to an augmented duty that compounds the negligence for liability to be assessed. Still, the prospects
for recovery under this standard are both isolated and remote.
253 (W.D. Ohio 1982), aff'd, 723 F.2d 22 (1983); Nunn v. Nat'l Fresh Fruit and Vegetable

Co., Inc., 541 F. Supp. 469, 477 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
145. 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir.), reh'gdenied, 528 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated, 649 F.2d
1207 (6th Cir. 1981), afd, 707 F.2d 259 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 424 (1983).
146. 523 F.2d at 310.
147. 707 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1983).
148. 649 F.2d 1207, 1212 (6th Cir. 1981) (failure to file grievance statement was based
on reliance on past prevailing practice and therefore conduct was merely simple negligence, which does not constitute a breach of DFR). Compare 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975).
149. Dutrisac v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 511 F. Supp. 719 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Brown v.
Int'l Union, United Auto, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of Am., 512 F.
Supp. 1337 (W.D. Mich. 1981), aff'd, 689 F.2d 69 (1982).
150. 511 F. Supp. 719 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
151. Id. at 727 (however, if the decision was rationally based, the action was not
arbitrary).
152. 512 F. Supp. 1337 (W.D. Mich. 1981), aff'd, 689 F.2d 69, 71-72 (6th Cir. 1982) (no
opinion as to negligence standard).
153. 512 F. Supp. at 1359-60.
154. id. at 1361.
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RELIEF

The NLRB

In unfair labor practice proceedings brought before the NLRB, the
Board can award any loss of earnings necessary to return the employee
to his former status. Generally this consists of reinstatement with back
pay. 15 5 In any suit brought as a hybrid claim against the union and employer, the Board will apportion liability according to the fault of
each. 1 56 Yet, if the conduct of an employer does not amount to an unfair labor practice, but did constitute a breach of contract, the Board is
powerless to order the employer to furnish any compensation. 1 5 7 This
has left the union with the weight of compensating the employee for
losses arising from the union's failure to process a grievance. 158 The
Board has also awarded attorney's fees for an independent counsel used
at arbitration. 159
B.

The Courts

The scope of a damage award in hybrid DFR suits in the courts was
established in Vaca v. Sipes. 160 "If a breach of the duty by the union and
a breach of contract by the employer are proven, the court must fashion
an appropriate remedy."' 6 1 Vaca left the question open to a certain extent by asserting that "[the appropriate remedy] must vary with the circumstance of the particular breach."162 The Court maintained that the
employer should be liable for damages resulting from the breach of contract, and that the union's liability is determined by increases in those
63
damages resulting from a failure to process the claim. 1

The scope of the award available in the courts under section 301
has proved more versatile and fruitful for plaintiffs than that awarded by
the NLRB. Although the Supreme Court has determined that punitive
damages are not recoverable in DFR suits, 1 64 the Sixth Circuit has re155. Back pay is computed with interest. A 12% interest rate award made by the NLRB
was upheld as representing the current borrowing rate in North Cambria Fuel Co., Inc. v.

NLRB, 645 F.2d 177 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981).
156. NLRB v. Pac. Coast Util. Serv., Inc., 638 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam)
(company's wrongful discharge of employee, plus inadequate union representation resulted in joint and several liability).
157. Elec. Workers (IUE) Local 485, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 170
N.L.R.B. 1234 (1968),supplemented, 183 N.L.R.B. 1286 (1970), enforced in part, 454 F.2d 17

(2d Cir. 1972).
158. 417 UAW, 245 N.L.R.B. 527 (1979).
159. Glass Bottle Bowers Ass'n Local No. 106, 240 N.L.R.B. 324 (1979).
160. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
161. Id. at 187.
162. Id. at 195.
163. Id. at 197-98. Note that the Court in Vaca distinguished this rule from incidents
when the union affirmatively caused the employer to breach the contract, in which case it is

likely that joint and several liability would be assessed (citing Imparato Stevedoring Corp.,
113 N.L.R.B. 883 (1955); Squirt Distrib. Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 1667 (1975); H.M. Newman, 85

N.L.R.B. 725 (1949)).
164. Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 46-52 (1979) (offsetting the potential for

deterrence of unfair representation was the "possibility that punitive awards could impair
the financial stability of unions," at 48).
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cently upheld an award of damages for mental and emotional dis66
tress.1 65 Akin to the remedial authority of the Board, attorney's fees1
and reinstatement' 6 7 have also been granted by the courts. In addition,
damages for future losses have been determined an appropriate form of
relief. 168
Since the Vaca court announced the standard for apportionment in
hybrid DFR suits, 169 the Supreme Court has considered the question of
apportionment of damages four times, 170 finally arriving at a new standard in Bowen v. United States Postal Service.171
In Czosek v. O'Mara,' 72 the Court affirmed the standard announced
in Vaca by asserting that a party is only liable for those damages flowing
from his conduct. 173 Therefore, "damages against the union for loss of
employment are unrecoverable except to the extent that its refusal to
handle the grievances added to the difficulty and expense of collecting
74
from the employer."1
Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. 175 reified the rulings of Vaca and
Czosek, but ruled that an arbitration award can be vacated if a breach of a
union's DFR is shown, 1 76 affording the employee a new order from the
court apportioning damages between union and employer based on the
foregoing principles.
While precluding an award of punitive damages for a breach of
DFR, the Court in Electrical Workers v. Foust,177 cited Vaca as precedent
for an award of damages in a DFR suit. 178 But the Vaca standard did not
last.
In Bowen v. United States Postal Service,179 the Supreme Court greatly
increased a union's liability in hybrid section 301 DFR suits. The Court,
claiming consistency with prior decisions, held that a union is responsible for all damages accruing from the time when it halted processing of a
165. Farmer v. ARA Services, Inc., 660 F.2d 1096, 1107 (6th Cir. 1981).
166. Del Casal v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 634 F.2d 295, 301 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 892 (1981) (reimbursement by union for employee's independently retained
attorney).
167. De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Travajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 291 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970) (the remedy of reinstatement in § 301 suit not barred
by § 4(a) of the Norris- Laguardia Act).
168. Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229, 1246 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 839 (1980) ("j]ury entitled to take into account the continuing nature of the
injury sustained by plaintiffs.")
169. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
170. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212 (1983); Elec. Workers v. Foust,
442 U.S. 42 (1979); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976); Czosek v.
O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970).
171. 459 U.S. 212 (1983).
172. 397 U.S. 25 (1969).
173. Id. at 29.
174. Id. (as long as the union had no hand in causing the discharge).
175. 424 U.S. 554 (1975).
176. Id. at 569-571.
177. 442 U.S. 42 (1979) ("[Rlelief should be fashioned to make the employee whole,"
citing Steele, 323 U.S. at 207).
178. Id. at 49-50.
179. 459 U.S. 212 (1983).
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grievance, if that cessation was a breach of DFR.180 The Bowen Court, in
support of its position, alluded to Vaca's statement that increases in
damages are attributable to the union.1 81 This formulation of apportionment will result in findings of union liability for all back pay from the
time of its refusal until the controversy is resolved in the courts; a potentially crippling sum when one considers the span of some controversies. 18 2 Increasing the union's liability in DFR suits is in recognition of
the employer's reliance on the union's decision not to process a grievance, according to the Court.' 83 Although this consideration seems
slight in light of such a drastic penalty, the Court was certainly correct
when it stated its rule on apportionment would "provide additional incentives for the union to process its member's claims where warranted."' 18 4 Whether lower courts will adhere to such an imposing
penalty on union conduct will be revealed in time.
V.

EXHAUSTION

An employee's failure to exhaust remedies provided in the collective bargaining agreement and in the union's constitution and by-laws is
a defense for the union and employer in DFR suits. Like most rules,
though, there are exceptions to this procedural prerequisite to DFR
actions.
A.

Internal Union Remedies

The Supreme Court resolved another part of the section 301 DFR
puzzle in Clayton v. Automobile Workers,' 8 5 a section 301 hybrid suit
brought by an employee discharged for violation of a plant rule prohibiting "defined misbehavior."' 1 6 After pursuing the employee's grievance through three steps of the grievance procedure, the union
withdrew a timely request for arbitration.' 8 7 The UAW's constitution
required exhaustion of internal union appeals before commencing an
action outside the union; this, employee Clayton did not do.' 8 8 Instead
89
he filed suit under section 301 in the Northern District of California.'
190
Both union and employer raised the defense of failure to exhaust.
In
allowing Clayton's claims to proceed, the court addressed three factors
as relevant:
[F]irst, whether union officials are so hostile to the employee
that he could not hope to obtain a fair hearing on his claim;
second, whether the internal union appeal procedures would
180. Id. at 223.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 223-24.
Consider the eight-year legacy of Ruzicka, supra note 145.
459 U.S. at 226.
Id. at 227.

185. 451 U.S. 679 (1981).
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 682.
Id.
Id. at 682-83.

189. Id. at 683.
190. Id. at 683-84.
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be inadequate either to reactivate the employee's grievance or
to award him the full relief he seeks under § 301; and third,
whether exhaustion of internal [union] procedures would unreasonably delay the employee's opportunity to obtain a judicial hearing on the merits of his claim.' 9 1
The Court concluded that even if an appeal by Clayton were received favorably by the union, it was foreclosed from demanding arbitration, because the time limit for filing an appeal had expired.' 9 2 Thus,
the Supreme Court established the "futility exception" to the requirement of exhaustion of internal union
remedies. Clayton has been cited in
93
many circuits without disfavor.'
Another possible exception to the failure to exhaust internal remedies defense is the claim of ignorance, yet the courts are split on the
propriety of this exception. In Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals Co. ,'94 the Court
affirmed a trial court ruling that exhaustion barred a claim despite the
fact that the employee was never informed of the requirement by his
union. 19 5 But when a union actively mislead the employee as to its exhaustion requirements, exhaustion by the employee was excused. 19 6
Accordingly, vague and uncertain by-laws,' 9 7 and the failure to provide
a spanish speaking employee with a translator' 9 8 have also precluded
assertion of the defense. Despite the apparent frequency of successful
counteractions to the defense, the requirement of exhaustion of internal
union procedures is still quite a viable defense as it fosters the preservation of the internal dispute resolution machinery. 199
B.

ContractualRemedies

Unlike most every other area of section 301 litigation, the requirement that an employee exhaust the contractual remedies provided in the
191. Id. at 689 ("If any of these factors are found to exist, the court may properly
excuse the employee's failure to exhaust.").
192. Id. at 691-692.
193. Majewski v. B'nai B'rith Int'l, 721 F.2d 823, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Local 644 Int'l
Photographers v. IATSE, 563 F. Supp. 1334, 1337 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (exhaustion of internal
union remedies unnecessary where union demonstrates unwillingness to hear local's
claim); Scott v. Local 863, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 725 F.2d 226, 229 (3rd Cir. 1984)
(citing Clayton as establishing case-by-case factual standard to ascertain futility); Doby v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 1162, 1167 (E.D. Va. 1981) (exhaustion not required
even when relief against one of the parties could be had); Haynes v. Bhd. of Ry. and Airline Clerks/Allied Serv. Div., 734 F.2d 219, 221 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (exhaustion
required where employee alleges hostility of union representing employee, and not union
officials who were to hear appeal); Monroe v. Int'l Union, UAW, 723 F.2d 22, 24 (6th Cir.
1983) (failure to exhaust precludes suit against union and employer); Schultz v. Owens
Illinois, Inc., 696 F.2d 505, 513 (7th Cir. 1982) (exhaustion not required because time
limit had expired); Rader v. United Transp. Union, 718 F.2d 1012, 1014 (11 th Cir. 1983).
194. 615 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
195. Id. at 1214.
196. Ruggirello v. Ford Motor Co., 411 F. Supp. 758, 762 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (union
estopped from asserting exhaustion of internal remedies defense when employee's attorney's ignorance was a result of union misrepresentation).
197. Robinson v. Marsh Plating Corp., 443 F.Supp. 811, 813-814 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
198. Retana v. Apartment, Motel, Hotel & Elevator Operators Local 14,453 F.2d 1018,
1027 (9th Cir. 1972).
199. Clayton, 451 U.S. at 694-95.
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collective bargaining agreement between union and employer was not
established in Vaca v. Sipes, but two years earlier in Republic Steel Corp. v.
Maddox.200 In Maddox, an employee laid off by his company brought suit
to recover severence pay as required in the collective bargaining agreement. 20 ' Employee Maddox failed to utilize the three-step grievance
and arbitration procedure before he brought suit in Alabama state court
alleging breach of contract. The Supreme Court held that "individual
employees wishing to assert contract grievances must attempt use of the
contract grievance procedure agreed upon by employer and union as a
mode of redress." '20 2 The Court justified its holding alluding to congressional intent as preferring deference to the grievance machinery as
20 3
provided in the contract.
Vaca v. Sipes20 4 proceeded to carve out two exceptions to the Maddox
doctrine. First, if an employee can prove a breach of a union's DFR in
processing the grievance, exhaustion of contractual remedies is no defense to union or employer. 20 5 Second, if the conduct of the employer
amounts to a repudiation of the contractual procedures, exhaustion
20 6
again becomes an ineffective defense.
In Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co.,207 a case decided
shortly after Vaca, the Supreme Court established a "futility" exception
to the exhaustion of contractual remedies requirement. Stating that
pursuit of contractual remedies would have proved "absolutely futile,"
the Court attributed creation of the exception to cover situations in
which "application of the exhaustion rule would defeat the overall pur20 8
poses of federal labor relations policy."
The Supreme Court apparently felt a need to firmly establish exceptions to the requirement of exhaustion to afford the employee relief
when no other was available. The courts were essentially opening the
door to judicial review of a claim after the employee had tried all the
others in the hallway to no avail.
VI.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Although Congress provided federal statutory rights of redress
under the NLRA, Congress failed to provide a statutory limitations period. When faced with this situation, federal courts have traditionally
20 9
adopted the limitations period of an analogous state statute.
Problems arose in the context of the hybrid action because courts lacked
200. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
201. Id. at 650-651.
202. Id. at 652.
203. Id. at 653.
204. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
205. Id. at 186. See also Miller v. Gateway Transp. Co., Inc., 616 F.2d 272, 274-275
(7th Cir. 1980) (DFR breach plus a showing that grievance was meritorious required to
establish exception to defense of failure to exhaust contractual remedies).
206. 386 U.S. at 185.
207. 393 U.S. 324 (1969).
208. Id. at 329-31.
209. Campbell v. Hauerhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895); McCluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. 270
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uniformity in their characterization of the underlying claim. 210
Since unfair representation actions are frequently brought in conjunction with section 301 actions, characterization of a claim as one in
contract, rather than tort, greatly extends the statute of limitations period. 2 11 The courts' only guideline in choosing the proper limitations
period is to best effectuate the underlying federal policy. 2 12 The court
in Abrams v. CarrierCorp.2 13 found the claims against the union to be so
intimately related to the claims against the employer that the six year
statute of limitations was applied to both the employer and
the union,
2 14
greatly increasing the length of the union's vulnerability.
The United States Supreme Court faced the problem of choosing
the most appropriate state statute of limitations period in United Parcel
Service v. Mitchell.2 15 Mitchell was discharged by his employer for alleged
dishonest acts. A grievance was filed by the union and submitted to a
joint employer-union grievance panel pursuant to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. The panel upheld the discharge. Seventeen months later Mitchell filed a complaint in the federal district court
against the union and employer under Section 301 (a) alleging the union
breached its duty of fair representation
and the employer had dis2 16
charged him without reason.
Both the union and employer moved for summary judgment on the
ground that the ninety-day statute of limitations for vacation of arbitration awards barred this action. The district court granted the motion,
but it was vacated by the Second Circuit, which held the proper statute
2 17
of limitations as the six-year contract statute.
The Supreme Court found that the district court made the proper
choice given the two state law alternatives and the undesirable effect of
having the results of the arbitration process suspended in limbo for long
periods of time. 2 18 Justices Blackmun and Brennan, while concurring
with the majority, felt that the six-month statute of section 10(b) of the
2 19
Act should be used as the appropriate limitation.
(1830). This traditional rule was applied in the context of a § 301 suit in United Auto
Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704-05 (1966).
210. Tuma v. Am. Can Co., 367 F. Supp. 1178 (D.N.J. 1973). "[Tihe determinations
by various courts of how to classify the unfair representation claim in order to determine
what particular state statute of limitations to apply have been anything but uniform." Id. at
1183.
21 1. States commonly have a six year statute of limitations for contract actions,
whereas the typical statute of limitations period in tort is one year.
212. United Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
213. 434 F.2d 1234 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied sub nom. United Steelworkers v. Abrams,
401 U.S. 1009 (1971).
214. Id.
215. 451 U.S. 56 (1981).
216. Id. at 58-59.
217. Mitchell v. United Parcel Serv., 624 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1980).
218. 451 U.S. 56 (1981).
219. Id. at 64-65 (BlackmunJ., concurring); Id. at 65-71 (Stewart,J., concurring). Section 10(b) of the NLRA is found at 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) and provides in pertinent part:
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is engaging in any such
unfair labor practice, the Board, or any agent or agency designated by the Board
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The Court had the opportunity to address the applicability of Section 10(b) in the context of a hybrid suit in Del Costello v. International
Bortherhood of Teamsters.22 0 Del Costello, employed as a truck driver,
either quit or was fired for refusing to drive a tractor trailer which he
found to be unsafe. The union, unsuccessful in its attempt to reinstate
Del Costello, brought a formal grievance pursuant to the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement. A hearing was held before a regional
union-management committee which concluded the grievance was without merit.

22 1

Approximately six months later Del Costello filed an action in federal district court alleging wrongful discharge in violation of the collective bargaining agreement against the employer and breach of the duty
of fair representation against the union. The defendants asserted that
the state thirty-day statute of limitations of actions to vacate arbitration
awards barred Del Costello's claims. The district court originally disagreed, holding the state statute of limitations for contract actions was
the proper limitations period. 2 22 On reconsideration the court granted
the summary judgment motion, holding the Mitchell decision compels
application of the thirty day limitations period for both the union and
the employer. 2 23 This decision was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit Court
22 4
of Appeals.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider Del
Costello and the companion case of Flowers v. Local 2602, United Steelworkers of America22 5 in light of Mitchell. The Court noted that the hybrid suit
has no close analogy in ordinary state law and the analogies suggested in
Mitchell suffer from serious legal and practical flaws. Quoting from Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Mitchell, the Court held:
In § 10(b) of the NLRA, Congress established a limitations period attuned to what is viewed as the proper balance between
bargaining relationships and finality of private settlements, and
an employee's interest in setting aside what he views as an unjust settlement under the collective bargaining system ....
Accordingly, '[t]he need for uniformity' among procedures followed for similar claims, ...

as well as the clear congressional

indication of the proper balance between the interests at stake
the appropricounsels the adoption of § 10(b) of the NLRA as
226
ate limitations period for lawsuits such as this.

of such purposes, shall have power to issue and cause to serve upon such person
a complaint . . . no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice
occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge.
220. 103 S. Ct. 2281 (1983).
221. Id. at 2285-86.
222. Del Costello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 510 F. Supp. 716 (D. Md. 1981).
223. Del Costello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 524 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1981).
224. Del Costello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 679 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1982) (mem.).
225. 622 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1980) (mem.) (Flowers was also a hybrid suit which was dismissed for failure to file a complaint within New York's 90 day statute of limitations for
actions to vacate arbitration awards).
226. 103 S. Ct. at 2294, quoting United Parcel Serv. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 70-71
(1981) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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In Barnett v. United Air Lines, Inc.22 7 the Tenth Circuit applied the
section 10(b) six-month statute to a hybrid section 301 case brought
under the RLA. The RLA provides a two-year statute in provisions governing practice before the National Railway Adjustment Board
(NRAB). 2 28 In arriving at the holding, the Tenth Circuit rejected application of the two-year RLA statute, finding a hybrid DFR cause of action
under the RLA more akin to hybrid suits under the NLRA than to practice before the NRAB. 2 29 The court placed a great deal of reliance on
Del Costello's statements regarding the congressional intent of uniform
23 0
enforcement under the federal laws.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In recent years the Supreme Court has resolved many of the procedural controversies facing DFR suits brought under section 301 of the
Taft-Hartley Act. 23 1 The only areas which remain unresolved are the
right to jury trial 23 2 and the standard to be applied when determining
whether arbitrary union conduct is a breach of DFR. The Court has apparently allocated the latter determination to the lower courts because
fact patterns are bound to be so varied that a single pronouncement of
the standard would not accommodate the interests of all those involved.
The Supreme Court, in rendering final determinations in areas of procedural controversy in section 301 DFR suits, has determined that this
cause of action has finally come of age. This trend can be interpreted as
an effort to iron out the wrinkles in DFR procedure, paving an avenue of
relief in the courts for the wronged employee. The Court's actions have
firmly established that the labor dispute mechanisms evisioned by Congress in 1935 are insufficient without the buttress of judicial
233
intervention.
Certain factors mitigate the desirability of a section 301 suit as opposed to an unfair labor practice proceeding brought before the Board.
As with most judicial proceedings, much time generally passes before a
claim is heard. Whereas unfair labor practice proceedings brought
before the Board are given priority over all other claims. 23 4 Addition227. 738 F.2d 358 (10th Cir.), vacating Barnett v. United Air Lines, Inc., 729 F.2d 693
(10th Cir. 1984).
228. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First(r) (1982).
229. 738 F.2d at 363.
230. Id.,
citing Del Costello, 103 S. Ct. at 2289.
231.

Statute of limitations, Del Costello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 103 S. Ct. 2281

(1983); scope of damage award, Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212 (1983);
Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979); Vaca v. Sipes, 386, U.S. 171
(1967); exhaustion of internal union remedies, Clayton v. Auto. Workers, 451 U.S. 679

(1980); exhaustion of contractual remedies, Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650
(1965); preemption, Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
232. ABA SEC. OF LAB. AND EMPL. I THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, 1306 (C.J. Morris
ed., 2d ed. 1983).
233. As recently as 1978, one author noted, "If one theme is apparent, it is the continuing uncertainty over the final contours of the doctrine [DFR] and the constant state of flux
in the Board and the courts."

T.J. BOYCE, FAIR REPRESENTATION, THE NLRB AND THE

Cotrs 119 (1978). Since 1978, many of the "contours" have achieved final shape.
234. 29 U.S.C. 160(m) (1982).
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ally, it can be assumed that the Board is more familiar with labor issues
and disputes than most judicial forums. Finally, in unfair labor practice
proceedings, no breach of contract need be proved.
Nevertheless, when weighing the relative advantages of suits
brought before the NLRB and those in the courts under section 301, the
latter emerges as the preferential route. Consider these advantages: the
courts can award damages, even for harms as intangible as mental distress;2 3 5 the NLRB, a politically appointed body, has unreviewable discretion to hear cases, while an employee who brings a section 301 suit is
assured of his "day in court"; lastly, in section 301 DFR suits, the court
entertains claims against both union and employer, 23 6 enhancing the
prospect of full recovery for the employee, as opposed to the NLRB
which has recently refrained from entertaining "hybrid" suits.

23 7

This note has covered the origins and current standards applied by
lower courts toward the duty of fair representation. Additionally, the
procedural barriers that at one time inhibited and obscured the judiciary's role in DFR claims have also been examined. With the assistance
of the Supreme Court, the section 301 DFR suit has evolved into a
nearly finished judicial product. In the fifty years since the passage of
the Wagner Act, labor organizations have become somewhat independent political bodies, disassociated from their membership. Consequently, the unions' interests may, for reasons intolerable to the judicial
system, deviate from those of individual employees who entrust the unions with their representation. The maturation of the section 301 DFR
suit marks a return to recognition of the original purpose of the American labor movement: the establishment and preservation of individual
employee's rights.
Jonathan S. Willett

235. Farmer v. ARA Services, 660 F.2d 1096, 1106 (6th Cir. 1981).
236. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.

